Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Monday, November 27, 2006
Tentación (Tres)
No hay nada mejor que un helado de vainilla con chispas de chocolate, en la tarde de un lunes, después del seminario del día, con la academia en la espalda, después de discutir al lenguaje y sus consecuencias, olvidando el despertar y su irresoluble batalla, sin siquiera pensar en la dificultad de la apertura del párpado, dejando de lado la oscuridad de la mañana, cuando al fin se ha ido la desesperación de un largo día por venir, dejando en el oprobio al frío que se avecina y su hermana depresión, cuando nadie nos recuerda que existe un mundo mas allá de la vainilla y sus chispas, cuando nada nos hace pensar (ni por asomo) que la tarea es interminable, en ese momento del lunes de fin de semestre en que uno se permite creer que no hay más días por venir y que todo ha concluído. No hay nada mejor que un helado de vainilla, con chispas de chololate y el desapego total de quien da dos centavos por una educación de millón.
¡Qué tentación!
¡Qué tentación!
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Tentación (Dos)
Dejarlo todo. Desaparecer. Ni siquiera inventar la burbuja, el espacio de tiempo detenido para poder volar. No. Eso sigue siendo cobarde, sigue siendo timido. Tengo la tentación de tener el valor. De caminar y alejarme sin huir. Simplemente seguir, andar y olvidar sin importancia. Con una total indiferencia en el cuello que me impida redirigir el campo de visión. Que los pies dirijan la mirada. Que el horizonte no lo determine la mera espera, la silla, la expectación.
Tentación de tener el valor de caminar hasta que el mundo llegue a su fin. Dar media vuelta y regresar. Tentación de que los pies sigan a las letras y las letras se liberen de los dedos. Tentación de que la lengua no se imponga. Tentación de fuerza, de valor, de imposición de uno mismo sobre lo interno tan ajeno. Tentación de destrucción. De reconstrucción. Tentación de caminar con fuerza y sin memoria. Tentación de hurto. Tentación de uno mismo por presentarse sin demostrar, sin prefabricados, sin plástico.
Tengo la tentación de un día salir a pie, tranquilo, sin cargar nada en la espalda, sin llevar nada en los bolsillos, sin transportar nada en la cabeza. Sólo caminar. Tengo la tentación de andar y andar, hasta llegar a casa; sin saber dónde está. La tentación de destruir el mundo tan sólo por caminar.
Tentación de tener el valor de caminar hasta que el mundo llegue a su fin. Dar media vuelta y regresar. Tentación de que los pies sigan a las letras y las letras se liberen de los dedos. Tentación de que la lengua no se imponga. Tentación de fuerza, de valor, de imposición de uno mismo sobre lo interno tan ajeno. Tentación de destrucción. De reconstrucción. Tentación de caminar con fuerza y sin memoria. Tentación de hurto. Tentación de uno mismo por presentarse sin demostrar, sin prefabricados, sin plástico.
Tengo la tentación de un día salir a pie, tranquilo, sin cargar nada en la espalda, sin llevar nada en los bolsillos, sin transportar nada en la cabeza. Sólo caminar. Tengo la tentación de andar y andar, hasta llegar a casa; sin saber dónde está. La tentación de destruir el mundo tan sólo por caminar.
Saturday, November 25, 2006
Tentación (Uno)
No pude evitarlo. La tentación es demasiado grande. Sentir el corer de los dedos y obtener algo, lo que sea, que tenga final, o la representación del mismo, en un punto, o una coma. Comenzó sin tener principio, como suelen ser las cosas. Olvidemos ya los mitos, pongamos fin a nuestro afán, nuestra ambición. No hay razón para escupir a la razón de sí misma y así abarcarlo todo. No lo hay. Aún así seguimos. No nos permitimos el lujo de limitarnos. Inventamos inicios donde no los hay y nos aseguramos de abrazarlo todo. Somos sordos a la constante afirmación de que, por mucho que se luche, necesariamente algo se olvidará.
Quiero escribir en castellano y nada más. Sin afanes metafísicos. No más por favor, no más. Y permitirme líneas básicas. Sujeto y predicado, sin distinción de objecto y acción. Sin adjetivos, apellidos, propiedades ni modos. Tanta verborrea, tanta parafernalia. Quiero escribir como se escribo y no como se debe escribir.
Para luego dar los brincos. Qué horror! Ni cómo describir que el Sol está afuera, se acaba Noviembre, y uno puede andar por la calle sin arriesgar la vida ante una hipotermia inminente. No hay manera de hacerlo. Si el pasto trae consigo inferencias, señales y engaños; qué no traerán Noviembre y el frío invernal?
Cortaré esta tentación antes de que algo más triste suceda.
Quiero escribir en castellano y nada más. Sin afanes metafísicos. No más por favor, no más. Y permitirme líneas básicas. Sujeto y predicado, sin distinción de objecto y acción. Sin adjetivos, apellidos, propiedades ni modos. Tanta verborrea, tanta parafernalia. Quiero escribir como se escribo y no como se debe escribir.
Para luego dar los brincos. Qué horror! Ni cómo describir que el Sol está afuera, se acaba Noviembre, y uno puede andar por la calle sin arriesgar la vida ante una hipotermia inminente. No hay manera de hacerlo. Si el pasto trae consigo inferencias, señales y engaños; qué no traerán Noviembre y el frío invernal?
Cortaré esta tentación antes de que algo más triste suceda.
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
You are still wrong
Communication seems to go low here.
Sam still thinks all there is here is me being confused with scoping over mental states and non-mental states. I think this is false, and that I just can’t manage to convey the message. So I’ll express it once more, but this time I’ll use Sam’s own claims.
Granted: It is true, as Sam thinks, that scoping over mental states and scoping of non-mental states is a different matter. I agree fully. They are so distinct that we can even quantify over beliefs without quantifying over their content. Example:
(1) There is such thing as Sam’s believe that this is just a scope problem.
However,
(2) There is no such thing as a misuse of scope here.
I also think that quantifying over mental states, in and of itself, is a difficult matter. Furthermore, even though it is distinct from quantifying over non-mental states, the relations between these two quantifications are quite intricate and difficult to understand. What I am aiming at is precisely one of the problematic relations between them. Take, for example, Sam’s last comment. He claims that (5) is incompatible with (6’), but not with (6).
(5) Necessarily I do not believe any houses are red.
(6’) I believe there are red houses.
(6) There are red houses.
Until now I have been presupposing a very obvious law, among the core ones, of Folk Psychology. This obvious law says:
Obvious Law: If S accepts that p, then S believes that p.
This obvious law, has an obvious consequence:
Obvious Consequence of the Obvious Law: If S does not believe that p, S doesn’t accept that p.
And this in turn has another obvious consequence:
Obvious Consequence of the Obvious Consequence: If S cannot believe that p, S cannot accept that p.
Let’s go back to Sam’s claims. As Sam correctly points out, if (5) is true, then (6’) is false. Now, the question is, why is it false? The answer, thanks to our obvious law and its obvious consequences, is that (6’) is false because I cannot believe that there are red houses. But, this is not all of what our obvious laws give to us. Our obvious laws also tell us that if I cannot believe that there are red houses, then I also cannot accept that there are red houses. Thus, I cannot accept that (6) is true.
To sum up, if (5) – a sentence where the scope is over beliefs – is true, then (6’) a sentence about beliefs is not true. However, if (6) – a sentence that does not talk about beliefs – is about that part of the world that (5) – that old sentence scoping over beliefs – tells us we cannot believe in, then (6) is unbelievable, unacceptable, or otherwise incomprehensible for the individual mentioned in (5).
Briefly speaking, if (5) is true, then (6) is unacceptable. If Sam still doesn’t agree with this, I’ll just don’t know what to do.
Communication is going low here.
Sam still thinks all there is here is me being confused with scoping over mental states and non-mental states. I think this is false, and that I just can’t manage to convey the message. So I’ll express it once more, but this time I’ll use Sam’s own claims.
Granted: It is true, as Sam thinks, that scoping over mental states and scoping of non-mental states is a different matter. I agree fully. They are so distinct that we can even quantify over beliefs without quantifying over their content. Example:
(1) There is such thing as Sam’s believe that this is just a scope problem.
However,
(2) There is no such thing as a misuse of scope here.
I also think that quantifying over mental states, in and of itself, is a difficult matter. Furthermore, even though it is distinct from quantifying over non-mental states, the relations between these two quantifications are quite intricate and difficult to understand. What I am aiming at is precisely one of the problematic relations between them. Take, for example, Sam’s last comment. He claims that (5) is incompatible with (6’), but not with (6).
(5) Necessarily I do not believe any houses are red.
(6’) I believe there are red houses.
(6) There are red houses.
Until now I have been presupposing a very obvious law, among the core ones, of Folk Psychology. This obvious law says:
Obvious Law: If S accepts that p, then S believes that p.
This obvious law, has an obvious consequence:
Obvious Consequence of the Obvious Law: If S does not believe that p, S doesn’t accept that p.
And this in turn has another obvious consequence:
Obvious Consequence of the Obvious Consequence: If S cannot believe that p, S cannot accept that p.
Let’s go back to Sam’s claims. As Sam correctly points out, if (5) is true, then (6’) is false. Now, the question is, why is it false? The answer, thanks to our obvious law and its obvious consequences, is that (6’) is false because I cannot believe that there are red houses. But, this is not all of what our obvious laws give to us. Our obvious laws also tell us that if I cannot believe that there are red houses, then I also cannot accept that there are red houses. Thus, I cannot accept that (6) is true.
To sum up, if (5) – a sentence where the scope is over beliefs – is true, then (6’) a sentence about beliefs is not true. However, if (6) – a sentence that does not talk about beliefs – is about that part of the world that (5) – that old sentence scoping over beliefs – tells us we cannot believe in, then (6) is unbelievable, unacceptable, or otherwise incomprehensible for the individual mentioned in (5).
Briefly speaking, if (5) is true, then (6) is unacceptable. If Sam still doesn’t agree with this, I’ll just don’t know what to do.
Communication is going low here.
Monday, November 20, 2006
You must be wrong
Sam thinks you can solve the puzzle of false belief by merely distinguishing between (1) and (2).
(1) Possibly some of my beliefs are false.
(2) Necessarily I do not believe any of my beliefs are false.
I think, however, that Sam is being inconsistent and, thus, he must be wrong. Consider the following cases.
(4) Possibly some houses are red.
(5) Necessarily I do not believe any houses are red.
If I endorse (5) then I cannot accept (6), because in order to do so I would have to believe some houses are red.
(6) There are red houses.
If I cannot accept (6) it is because I exclude the possibility that (6) is true. But, if such is the case, then I cannot accept (4) at all. Thus, (7) is true.
(7) I cannot accept the possibility that some houses are red.
Mutatis mutandis, if I accept (2) I exclude the possibility that (8) is true.
(8) I have false beliefs.
If so, then I cannot accept (1) at all. Thus, (9) is true.
(9) I cannot accept the possibility that some of my beliefs are false.
Briefly speaking, if I accept (2) I cannot accept (1). Furthermore, if Sam is right and (2) is uncontroversial, then it is also uncontroversial that (1) is unacceptable. Hence, Sam’s uncontroversial solution to the puzzle doesn’t work at all.
(1) Possibly some of my beliefs are false.
(2) Necessarily I do not believe any of my beliefs are false.
I think, however, that Sam is being inconsistent and, thus, he must be wrong. Consider the following cases.
(4) Possibly some houses are red.
(5) Necessarily I do not believe any houses are red.
If I endorse (5) then I cannot accept (6), because in order to do so I would have to believe some houses are red.
(6) There are red houses.
If I cannot accept (6) it is because I exclude the possibility that (6) is true. But, if such is the case, then I cannot accept (4) at all. Thus, (7) is true.
(7) I cannot accept the possibility that some houses are red.
Mutatis mutandis, if I accept (2) I exclude the possibility that (8) is true.
(8) I have false beliefs.
If so, then I cannot accept (1) at all. Thus, (9) is true.
(9) I cannot accept the possibility that some of my beliefs are false.
Briefly speaking, if I accept (2) I cannot accept (1). Furthermore, if Sam is right and (2) is uncontroversial, then it is also uncontroversial that (1) is unacceptable. Hence, Sam’s uncontroversial solution to the puzzle doesn’t work at all.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
I can't be wrong
I’ll meet Sam’s challenge. Here’s something crazy that I believe in.
I believe it is impossible to have false beliefs. That is, I believe I cannot be wrong, though you can. I believe you believe that about yourself, and that you are right. This is, straightforwardly, a problem of the essential indexical. This time, however, the problem is not about content itself, but about the epistemic character of that content.
I presuppose that human psychology works in order to figure out the world. Having beliefs is a central part of this feat. I also presuppose that Pierce is right and that believing something is reaching a mental state of easiness, calm, and stability. Belief states are opposed to states of doubt and uncertainty. These ones force the organism to come up with some belief (i.e., to come up with some story that gets the easiness back, leaving out the worries and doubts). Thus, believing something is essentially a matter of having a story about the world, a matter of having figured out something such that easiness and tranquility governs the mind.
That’s why I can’t have false beliefs. Ascribing false beliefs is literally the same as doubting. When a false belief is ascribed, ignorance is given. Thus, no story about the world is around to be believed. In a sense, ascribing false beliefs is ill defined. It is something more like taking beliefs out of some organism, rather than positing them. This is why I cannot have false beliefs, but you can. I can believe in something that contradicts your belief, and so I go on and ascribe a false belief to you. And you do pretty much the same thing. This makes a lot of sense. What doesn’t make any sense is to go on ascribing false beliefs to your self. Self-ascription of beliefs is never a matter of ascribing false beliefs. False beliefs are essentially a third person invention; and a very useful one.
This creates a problem about belief revision. If self-ascribed beliefs are essentially ascribed as true beliefs, then no one can self-ascribe false beliefs. Belief revision, however, is a matter of self-ascribing false beliefs. Then belief revision appears to be impossible. No one can possibly believe that p and at the same time believe that p is false. Belief revision is supposed to be a matter of getting rid of false beliefs; but we cannot have them to begin with.
It seems then, that no belief revision process is a process of self-knowledge. Rather, it looks more like belief revision inherently involves ‘two’ minds, at least two slices of the same space-time worm. It couldn’t be otherwise, because I can’t be wrong, although you always can. And this does not, and cannot, translate into "Eduardo can’t be wrong, although M always can." As I said before, this is another problem with the essential indexical.
----
Congratulations Sam!
I believe it is impossible to have false beliefs. That is, I believe I cannot be wrong, though you can. I believe you believe that about yourself, and that you are right. This is, straightforwardly, a problem of the essential indexical. This time, however, the problem is not about content itself, but about the epistemic character of that content.
I presuppose that human psychology works in order to figure out the world. Having beliefs is a central part of this feat. I also presuppose that Pierce is right and that believing something is reaching a mental state of easiness, calm, and stability. Belief states are opposed to states of doubt and uncertainty. These ones force the organism to come up with some belief (i.e., to come up with some story that gets the easiness back, leaving out the worries and doubts). Thus, believing something is essentially a matter of having a story about the world, a matter of having figured out something such that easiness and tranquility governs the mind.
That’s why I can’t have false beliefs. Ascribing false beliefs is literally the same as doubting. When a false belief is ascribed, ignorance is given. Thus, no story about the world is around to be believed. In a sense, ascribing false beliefs is ill defined. It is something more like taking beliefs out of some organism, rather than positing them. This is why I cannot have false beliefs, but you can. I can believe in something that contradicts your belief, and so I go on and ascribe a false belief to you. And you do pretty much the same thing. This makes a lot of sense. What doesn’t make any sense is to go on ascribing false beliefs to your self. Self-ascription of beliefs is never a matter of ascribing false beliefs. False beliefs are essentially a third person invention; and a very useful one.
This creates a problem about belief revision. If self-ascribed beliefs are essentially ascribed as true beliefs, then no one can self-ascribe false beliefs. Belief revision, however, is a matter of self-ascribing false beliefs. Then belief revision appears to be impossible. No one can possibly believe that p and at the same time believe that p is false. Belief revision is supposed to be a matter of getting rid of false beliefs; but we cannot have them to begin with.
It seems then, that no belief revision process is a process of self-knowledge. Rather, it looks more like belief revision inherently involves ‘two’ minds, at least two slices of the same space-time worm. It couldn’t be otherwise, because I can’t be wrong, although you always can. And this does not, and cannot, translate into "Eduardo can’t be wrong, although M always can." As I said before, this is another problem with the essential indexical.
----
Congratulations Sam!
Friday, November 17, 2006
flying away
i started my own blog: Go Grue!. i doubt i will update it much. but i must say i was inspired by posting stuff on here to start one. so. maybe i'll still post here if i have something so important that everyone should read, or if eduardo types up something crazy again!! :-p
Saturday, November 11, 2006
Interesting Data
I’ve decided to publish some interesting data. There’s this interesting field of research that I’m willing to pursue: self-anthropology. I’ll start by collecting speech acts, and other sorts of behavior, from the social group located in the Northern town of Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. Here are some brief monologues:
Monologue #1
Subject 1: “Hey Edu (pronounced /i/dú by the native), do you know why Mexico never gets medals in the Olympics?”
Anthropologist: “Because they don’t care about the Olympics?”
Subject 1: “No. Because all the Mexicans that can run and jump have crossed to the US!”
A big laughter from the native and his clan (pronounced /klán/ by the anthropologist) members gives an end to the speech act.
Monologue #2
Subject 2: “ Hey Eduardo (the /r/ sound is eliminated by the native), I’m surprised that you made it all the way here. I mean, coming from a University in Mexico.”
The anthropologist didn’t know how to reply. So he decided to change the topic.
Monologue #3
Anthropologist: “I’m not sure if I want to take the offer from Michigan.”
Subject 3: “Where are you going to go then? To nowhere fucking Mexico?”
The anthropologist naively replies:
Anthropologist: “Well, I also have an offer from Texas, Austin.”
Subject 3: “Oh yeah! Well, Michigan’s better!”
The anthropologist expects, with some supporting evidence, to collect more data as time goes by.
Monologue #1
Subject 1: “Hey Edu (pronounced /i/dú by the native), do you know why Mexico never gets medals in the Olympics?”
Anthropologist: “Because they don’t care about the Olympics?”
Subject 1: “No. Because all the Mexicans that can run and jump have crossed to the US!”
A big laughter from the native and his clan (pronounced /klán/ by the anthropologist) members gives an end to the speech act.
Monologue #2
Subject 2: “ Hey Eduardo (the /r/ sound is eliminated by the native), I’m surprised that you made it all the way here. I mean, coming from a University in Mexico.”
The anthropologist didn’t know how to reply. So he decided to change the topic.
Monologue #3
Anthropologist: “I’m not sure if I want to take the offer from Michigan.”
Subject 3: “Where are you going to go then? To nowhere fucking Mexico?”
The anthropologist naively replies:
Anthropologist: “Well, I also have an offer from Texas, Austin.”
Subject 3: “Oh yeah! Well, Michigan’s better!”
The anthropologist expects, with some supporting evidence, to collect more data as time goes by.
Friday, November 10, 2006
Gay Marriage is Legalized in Mexico
One more reason to be a cultural autistic in Ann Arbor (where even minor moral and political correctness, like affirmative action, is rejected).
Finally, those Mexicans down there are giving some lessons to the intelligent white men in the white house.
Cultural Autism
Autism is characterized as a psychological disorder that results in poor social interaction, poor linguistic-social competence, and poor interaction with other subjects. Nowadays psychologists seem to agree that it is biologically determined (i.e. autistic kids inherit it from their parents). Autism can be identified in preschoolers because they do poorly in theory of mind tasks; the most common of them being the False Belief task. In this tasks children are told to report the belief of someone that has been deceived by a change in the world that they (the other person who is being deceived) are not aware of. If the infant has (at least the beginnings of) a theory of mind, she will be able to properly attribute a false belief to the subject.
Take for instance a kid and two experimenters X and Y. X is interacting with the kid, while Y is present. X then places a toy inside a cup that is on a table near the kid and then leaves the room. Then Y attracts the kid’s attention and takes the toy out of the cup and puts it inside a drawer. The kid knows that the toy is not anymore inside the cup, where X left it. If the kid is able to attribute beliefs, when asked about X’s beliefs, she should attribute the false belief that the toy is in the cup. Autistic kids are unable to do this. When asked where will X think the toy is, the kid just says “inside the drawer”.
A lack of a Theory of Mind is among the psychological impairments associated with autism. Since the use of a Theory of Mind is also essential for language acquisition (particularly for determining the intensions of other speakers), autistic kids also present linguistic impairments. In a word, this means that autistic persons are unable to recognize beliefs and emotions in other persons. For them, human behavior is a chaotic, unpredictable, salad of events. As a highly functional autistic has said, being autistic is like being an anthropologist in mars, trying to understand what aliens do, and why they do it. Obviously, being autistic is being unable to communicate. Autism results in an unbearable isolation from society. One’s own emotional and psychological life are kept from others. Autistics tend to explode because of this.
Now, asides from this neurological disorder, I want to present a social (i.e. non-biological) form of autism. This ‘cultural-autism’ as I call it, results also from the impairment of Theory of Mind capacities, but not totally from a lack of Theory of Mind. In order for a person to develop non-autistic capacities for social interaction, it is not only important to have ‘a’ Theory of Mind, but ‘the correct’ one; and these ones are always the result of the interaction with other persons ‘in particular environments’. Theory of Mind presupposes the capacity to identify emotions and predict them, as any other theory it has expectations, deceptions, and surprises. It is to be expected, then, that different environments will help develop different predictions, deceptions, and surprises. Cultural autism results from having the Theory of Mind that’s useful for one environment and using it in a different environment where it almost systematically fails.
Cata and I are non-autistic persons in the neuropsychological sense. There seems to be nothing wrong with our brain, we’ve been able to socialize properly in our previous environment. We have a good number of friends, and beloved ones with which we interact with ease. However, given the particular Theory of Mind that we’ve developed, we’ve become autistics in the cultural sense above mentioned.
We communicate in a way that presupposes the possession and expression of emotions. We presuppose human beings to have a lot more than reasons in the head. These predictions are constantly falsified by the data. We predict that if a graduate student looks for help from a professor, the professor will ‘think’ that the student is having ‘doubts’ and ‘problems’ that need to be solved through dialogues. The prediction doesn’t work!
We predict, also, that after many days of thinking a considerably difficult problem (e.g. how western society has neglected the role of interpreters as relevant for the meaning expressed by a song or piece of music; or how western societies have embellished themselves with idiotic dichotomies of thinking), when trying to present those problems to others (e.g. professors) these others will attend with patience, will not despair thinking that we are stupid, and will try to fill in the gaps of our inability to put out there what seems to be in here. We predict that people will be eager to understand and charitably interpret in a way that makes our thoughts sensible, interesting and cogent. This prediction doesn’t work either!
A third most important and frustrating prediction, says that human beings will express their emotions. It says that, when happy, a human will tend to cherish, hug, touch, smile and otherwise give signs of human existence. This latter prediction is awfully falsified. Almost no one in our new environment seems to be able to deal with this other important endowment of humans. Except for alcoholics, after suitably inebriated, emotions are surprisingly eliminated, inhibited and repressed. This is utterly frustrating. It includes the unfortunate prediction that professors will show emotions when the student shows the ability to understand. The prediction forms expectations that are not fulfilled, and this deception does not develop in a form of curious surprise, but constant depression.
It’s difficult to be a cultural autistic. Unlike anthropologists in Mars, we are like academics in Ann Arbor.
Take for instance a kid and two experimenters X and Y. X is interacting with the kid, while Y is present. X then places a toy inside a cup that is on a table near the kid and then leaves the room. Then Y attracts the kid’s attention and takes the toy out of the cup and puts it inside a drawer. The kid knows that the toy is not anymore inside the cup, where X left it. If the kid is able to attribute beliefs, when asked about X’s beliefs, she should attribute the false belief that the toy is in the cup. Autistic kids are unable to do this. When asked where will X think the toy is, the kid just says “inside the drawer”.
A lack of a Theory of Mind is among the psychological impairments associated with autism. Since the use of a Theory of Mind is also essential for language acquisition (particularly for determining the intensions of other speakers), autistic kids also present linguistic impairments. In a word, this means that autistic persons are unable to recognize beliefs and emotions in other persons. For them, human behavior is a chaotic, unpredictable, salad of events. As a highly functional autistic has said, being autistic is like being an anthropologist in mars, trying to understand what aliens do, and why they do it. Obviously, being autistic is being unable to communicate. Autism results in an unbearable isolation from society. One’s own emotional and psychological life are kept from others. Autistics tend to explode because of this.
Now, asides from this neurological disorder, I want to present a social (i.e. non-biological) form of autism. This ‘cultural-autism’ as I call it, results also from the impairment of Theory of Mind capacities, but not totally from a lack of Theory of Mind. In order for a person to develop non-autistic capacities for social interaction, it is not only important to have ‘a’ Theory of Mind, but ‘the correct’ one; and these ones are always the result of the interaction with other persons ‘in particular environments’. Theory of Mind presupposes the capacity to identify emotions and predict them, as any other theory it has expectations, deceptions, and surprises. It is to be expected, then, that different environments will help develop different predictions, deceptions, and surprises. Cultural autism results from having the Theory of Mind that’s useful for one environment and using it in a different environment where it almost systematically fails.
Cata and I are non-autistic persons in the neuropsychological sense. There seems to be nothing wrong with our brain, we’ve been able to socialize properly in our previous environment. We have a good number of friends, and beloved ones with which we interact with ease. However, given the particular Theory of Mind that we’ve developed, we’ve become autistics in the cultural sense above mentioned.
We communicate in a way that presupposes the possession and expression of emotions. We presuppose human beings to have a lot more than reasons in the head. These predictions are constantly falsified by the data. We predict that if a graduate student looks for help from a professor, the professor will ‘think’ that the student is having ‘doubts’ and ‘problems’ that need to be solved through dialogues. The prediction doesn’t work!
We predict, also, that after many days of thinking a considerably difficult problem (e.g. how western society has neglected the role of interpreters as relevant for the meaning expressed by a song or piece of music; or how western societies have embellished themselves with idiotic dichotomies of thinking), when trying to present those problems to others (e.g. professors) these others will attend with patience, will not despair thinking that we are stupid, and will try to fill in the gaps of our inability to put out there what seems to be in here. We predict that people will be eager to understand and charitably interpret in a way that makes our thoughts sensible, interesting and cogent. This prediction doesn’t work either!
A third most important and frustrating prediction, says that human beings will express their emotions. It says that, when happy, a human will tend to cherish, hug, touch, smile and otherwise give signs of human existence. This latter prediction is awfully falsified. Almost no one in our new environment seems to be able to deal with this other important endowment of humans. Except for alcoholics, after suitably inebriated, emotions are surprisingly eliminated, inhibited and repressed. This is utterly frustrating. It includes the unfortunate prediction that professors will show emotions when the student shows the ability to understand. The prediction forms expectations that are not fulfilled, and this deception does not develop in a form of curious surprise, but constant depression.
It’s difficult to be a cultural autistic. Unlike anthropologists in Mars, we are like academics in Ann Arbor.
Tuesday, November 07, 2006
It hurts so much to change my mind
Having beliefs is a difficult matter. They tend to be complex and embedded mental states difficult to identify. Changing them is even worse. Beliefs have their own mental gravity. They tend to stick on their places as they are supported by more and more beliefs as time goes by.
I think there are two reasons for this latter difficulty. First, following Pierce, acquiring beliefs is a matter of tranquility. Easiness, calm and satisfaction come with them. Recent studies with amnesiac patients have been able to prove this general claim. The level of stress associated with the feeling of knowledge is higher in these cases. It is, literally, psychologically disrupting and, hence, physiologically expensive not to have a belief about something and, thus, not to have the feeling of knowledge for that matter.
This expensive emotional mechanism attached to our epistemology seems to prove useful when it comes to find out what the environment looks like. It is expensive, though, when we must change this view. And this also seems to have a reason: it is really expensive, dissatisfying and unbearable to stay in doubt than to believe. So we will inevitably end up with a story. Think, for example, on how even in Matrix-like situations, we end up building a story. The Matrix, at least, is to be charged with the explanatory burden. Thus, it is chemically, mentally and, also, time consuming to change our beliefs.
But that’s not the whole story. There’s a second important problem to be mentioned: this is the fact that most of the time we don’t know how to modify our beliefs. Belief revision and, furthermore, belief substitution, is a highly complex metacognitive task. Think of each one of your beliefs as a thread of whole that forms part of a bigger fabric. If you find out that you cannot keep that line, or anything like it, and neither can you replace it with anything similar to it, like another piece of whole, how would you patch the fabric? Or put it this way. Say you’re told you have to take off a squared-shape piece of your house, and that you can’t replace it for just another square-shaped block of the same material. How would you do this?
This is how belief substitution looks like. Beliefs are always embedded within more beliefs. Hence, changing one most certainly requires changing more; and so, a more general architectural work is needed. Furthermore, beliefs are defined also by the way they are embedded. Thus, finding another belief with exactly the same inferential pattern won’t solve the architectural problem. This makes the task of changing our minds an incredibly difficult one. And things can get worse the deeper and stronger the beliefs are.
Thus, not only is it physiologically painful, mentally uneasy, and time consuming to change our minds. To change our beliefs also requires a degree of wisdom and self-knowledge. One must be able to identify the belief and, thus, the way it is embedded within other beliefs that support it and/or are supported by it. Furthermore, one must be able to come up with a new story, a different account of things, in order to replace it.
Asides from the fleeting beliefs about the immediate surroundings, those that we automatically substitute while keeping track of space and time (e.g. I started believing it was 5:25 am, I now believe it is 5:59), it is very difficult to revise our beliefs. We are never told how to do this. No one ever claims that this is what learning is supposed to be about, and so we rarely, or very painfully, learn.
It hurts so much to change our minds. We need to build up new and different ones.
I think there are two reasons for this latter difficulty. First, following Pierce, acquiring beliefs is a matter of tranquility. Easiness, calm and satisfaction come with them. Recent studies with amnesiac patients have been able to prove this general claim. The level of stress associated with the feeling of knowledge is higher in these cases. It is, literally, psychologically disrupting and, hence, physiologically expensive not to have a belief about something and, thus, not to have the feeling of knowledge for that matter.
This expensive emotional mechanism attached to our epistemology seems to prove useful when it comes to find out what the environment looks like. It is expensive, though, when we must change this view. And this also seems to have a reason: it is really expensive, dissatisfying and unbearable to stay in doubt than to believe. So we will inevitably end up with a story. Think, for example, on how even in Matrix-like situations, we end up building a story. The Matrix, at least, is to be charged with the explanatory burden. Thus, it is chemically, mentally and, also, time consuming to change our beliefs.
But that’s not the whole story. There’s a second important problem to be mentioned: this is the fact that most of the time we don’t know how to modify our beliefs. Belief revision and, furthermore, belief substitution, is a highly complex metacognitive task. Think of each one of your beliefs as a thread of whole that forms part of a bigger fabric. If you find out that you cannot keep that line, or anything like it, and neither can you replace it with anything similar to it, like another piece of whole, how would you patch the fabric? Or put it this way. Say you’re told you have to take off a squared-shape piece of your house, and that you can’t replace it for just another square-shaped block of the same material. How would you do this?
This is how belief substitution looks like. Beliefs are always embedded within more beliefs. Hence, changing one most certainly requires changing more; and so, a more general architectural work is needed. Furthermore, beliefs are defined also by the way they are embedded. Thus, finding another belief with exactly the same inferential pattern won’t solve the architectural problem. This makes the task of changing our minds an incredibly difficult one. And things can get worse the deeper and stronger the beliefs are.
Thus, not only is it physiologically painful, mentally uneasy, and time consuming to change our minds. To change our beliefs also requires a degree of wisdom and self-knowledge. One must be able to identify the belief and, thus, the way it is embedded within other beliefs that support it and/or are supported by it. Furthermore, one must be able to come up with a new story, a different account of things, in order to replace it.
Asides from the fleeting beliefs about the immediate surroundings, those that we automatically substitute while keeping track of space and time (e.g. I started believing it was 5:25 am, I now believe it is 5:59), it is very difficult to revise our beliefs. We are never told how to do this. No one ever claims that this is what learning is supposed to be about, and so we rarely, or very painfully, learn.
It hurts so much to change our minds. We need to build up new and different ones.
Sunday, November 05, 2006
I'm superstitious
And this is the 100th one!
I never thought I would make it. Thanks to everyone for the help. It was certainly needed to get here.
With sincere love,
--edu
I never thought I would make it. Thanks to everyone for the help. It was certainly needed to get here.
With sincere love,
--edu
Polymers, Mind and Limits
Lucia, Carlos and Abraham gave me a lecture at 4 am today, at the Fleetwood. Two concepts were the center of discussion: Polymer and Crystal. According to my professors, a polymer is any string of multiple units that finds a stable structure, while a Crystal is any compound that results from the infinite addition of a definite unit in an ordered manner. This being so, windows stop being crystals (their structure is not given by an ordered repetition of the same structure); and the salt and egg that I ate while learning were polymers.
This lecture has changed something in the world. It has enforced my idea that the human mind works as a story -teller, and a story reader. It has also enforce the idea that Pierce is right, and an essential mechanism of this story telling is given by a belief-doubt psychology, not only a belief-desire one.
Pierce thinks that belief, as a mental state, comes with a feeling of easiness and tranquility, whereas doubt comes with the opposite feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Beliefs and doubts shape human action. The former do so by shaping our desires, the latter by shaping our beliefs. The goal of doubt, truly speaking, is to vanish doubt, to find an account, an explanation, or a story to believe in. The goal of doubt is, therefore, belief.
This generates a little problem: if doubt generates belief, then what generates doubt? Like any other chicken and egg question, rejecting the dichotomy solves this one: there are no doubts without beliefs and no beliefs without doubts. To believe something, e.g. to believe that there are polymers, or that salt is a polymer, presupposes a rejection of other alternative theories (e.g. everything is made out of water). It presupposes, thus, reasons to doubt the other theories, feelings of uneasiness when the other stories are told. They, in a word, make no sense.
If this is true, then what we have here is an infinitely moving cognitive machine. We will never stop having doubts, for we will never stop having beliefs. This is the beauty of our evolutionary endowment. Things simply could not work if we were just to have certainty. The environment is an ever-changing structure; certainty, on the other hand, presupposes sameness. If our theories where to give us certainty we would stop looking, stop searching, and eventually loose track of the environment.
This is like a never-ending game with two possible viewpoints. On the one hand, you might like to be tragic and stress how perverse it is that nature endowed us with a need of certainty and, at the same time, the inability to retain it. On the other hand, you might just realize that this is the game, and this is how it’s played. If you do, you might as well enjoy watching your theories, your stories, and cartoons of the world crumbling down at the seams. The latter view seems more humble, and more easygoing.
It must be said, however, that the game has its own limitations. It is not as if, to go back to our lecture, we can just tell any single story. The environment forces some limits upon us, if not by giving direct evidence, at least by giving shots of certainty in the form of predictions. Not every concept is useful, and not all useful concepts are equally useful. We might be tempted to take the universe as a polymer, or as a crystal, or as a molecule. The definitions allow it, but the predictions won’t work.
The fact that we live on a string of certainty does not imply boundlessness. Not any story will work, and not every story that works does so for any given task. Polymer science cannot explain why human beings have come up with a story about polymers. For that you need another story, you need a story about the mind, its nature, and limits.
This lecture has changed something in the world. It has enforced my idea that the human mind works as a story -teller, and a story reader. It has also enforce the idea that Pierce is right, and an essential mechanism of this story telling is given by a belief-doubt psychology, not only a belief-desire one.
Pierce thinks that belief, as a mental state, comes with a feeling of easiness and tranquility, whereas doubt comes with the opposite feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Beliefs and doubts shape human action. The former do so by shaping our desires, the latter by shaping our beliefs. The goal of doubt, truly speaking, is to vanish doubt, to find an account, an explanation, or a story to believe in. The goal of doubt is, therefore, belief.
This generates a little problem: if doubt generates belief, then what generates doubt? Like any other chicken and egg question, rejecting the dichotomy solves this one: there are no doubts without beliefs and no beliefs without doubts. To believe something, e.g. to believe that there are polymers, or that salt is a polymer, presupposes a rejection of other alternative theories (e.g. everything is made out of water). It presupposes, thus, reasons to doubt the other theories, feelings of uneasiness when the other stories are told. They, in a word, make no sense.
If this is true, then what we have here is an infinitely moving cognitive machine. We will never stop having doubts, for we will never stop having beliefs. This is the beauty of our evolutionary endowment. Things simply could not work if we were just to have certainty. The environment is an ever-changing structure; certainty, on the other hand, presupposes sameness. If our theories where to give us certainty we would stop looking, stop searching, and eventually loose track of the environment.
This is like a never-ending game with two possible viewpoints. On the one hand, you might like to be tragic and stress how perverse it is that nature endowed us with a need of certainty and, at the same time, the inability to retain it. On the other hand, you might just realize that this is the game, and this is how it’s played. If you do, you might as well enjoy watching your theories, your stories, and cartoons of the world crumbling down at the seams. The latter view seems more humble, and more easygoing.
It must be said, however, that the game has its own limitations. It is not as if, to go back to our lecture, we can just tell any single story. The environment forces some limits upon us, if not by giving direct evidence, at least by giving shots of certainty in the form of predictions. Not every concept is useful, and not all useful concepts are equally useful. We might be tempted to take the universe as a polymer, or as a crystal, or as a molecule. The definitions allow it, but the predictions won’t work.
The fact that we live on a string of certainty does not imply boundlessness. Not any story will work, and not every story that works does so for any given task. Polymer science cannot explain why human beings have come up with a story about polymers. For that you need another story, you need a story about the mind, its nature, and limits.
Saturday, November 04, 2006
Affirmative Action... my balls
A algunos académicos en Estados Unidos les encanta llenarse la boca de dulces frases como "la necesidad de defender la discriminación positiva" o affirmative action, como le llaman por aquí. Se cree que es la única salida a un racismo rampante y cada vez más enraizado en esta sociedad. Sin embargo, un gran número de personas que dicen defender la discriminación positiva, lo hacen sólo de dientes pa' fuera.
En los departamentos de filosofía, por ejemplo, se habla mucho de la lucha por la discriminación positiva. El estado de Michigan, en particular, libra hoy día una batalla por mantener las políticas a favor. Existe, en contra de ésta, la infame proposición 2, que pretende acabar de raíz con la discriminación positiva. Todos, pues, la defienden. Sin embargo, muy pocos se permiten el lujo de pensar en las consecuencias de lo que defienden.
Pienso en especial en lo que deberían hacer esas mismas personas, buenos samaritanos y defensores de la discriminación positiva, en sus propias casas y lugares de trabajo. Deberían, por ejemplo, tomar a todos los estudiantes que no sean blancos y privilegiarlos con, por ejemplo, atención preferencial. Deberían, por ejemplo, darle mayor tiempo a sus estudiantes asiáticos, afrioamericanos e hispanos que a los estudiantes blancos, cristianos provenients de escuelas de gran prestigio.
Pero, evidentemente, tal atención preferencial es algo que no están dispuestos a hacer. Jamás se verá que un gran profesor dedique más atención, más recursos, a un alumno de posgrado proveniente de China con problemas de comunicación, por encima de un alumno blanco, nativo, proveniente de Harvard. Jamás se ha visto y jamás se verá. Lo que de hecho sucede en este país es que las mismísimas personas que tan vehementemente dicen defender la discriminación positiva, de hecho dedican más tiempo, muestran más interés y dan más apoyo a los estudiantes ya beneficiados por el racismo inherente a esta cultura. Así, sin mucha sorpresa, los departamentos se llenan de profesores blancos, varones, de clase media acomodada y educación privilegiada. Esto pretenden justificarlo apelando a la diferencia en capacidades entre los blancos y los hispanos, asiáticos, afroamericanos y mujeres. Los blancos, por alguna extraña razón que ellos parecen no comprender, son mejores. ¿Acaso es tan corta su imaginación que no logran ver que todo esto tiene origen en sus propias prácticas de trato preferencial a blancos, cómodos y bien educados? Todo esto demuestra, según veo, que en realidad no están dispuestos a defender la discriminación positiva. Todo se defiende siempre y cuando sean otros los que lo hagan.
La tan manoseada discriminación positiva se ha vuelto hoy día un instrumento más para tranquilizar los espíritus cristianos y temerosos de dios, que de tan pusilánimes no son capaces de reconocer su propia comodidad dentro de una práctica racista. Es, como decimos en mi pueblo, una manera de lavarse las manos. Eso sí, con mucho color. Nadie parece estar dispuesto a hacerlo!
Affirmative action mis huevos!
En los departamentos de filosofía, por ejemplo, se habla mucho de la lucha por la discriminación positiva. El estado de Michigan, en particular, libra hoy día una batalla por mantener las políticas a favor. Existe, en contra de ésta, la infame proposición 2, que pretende acabar de raíz con la discriminación positiva. Todos, pues, la defienden. Sin embargo, muy pocos se permiten el lujo de pensar en las consecuencias de lo que defienden.
Pienso en especial en lo que deberían hacer esas mismas personas, buenos samaritanos y defensores de la discriminación positiva, en sus propias casas y lugares de trabajo. Deberían, por ejemplo, tomar a todos los estudiantes que no sean blancos y privilegiarlos con, por ejemplo, atención preferencial. Deberían, por ejemplo, darle mayor tiempo a sus estudiantes asiáticos, afrioamericanos e hispanos que a los estudiantes blancos, cristianos provenients de escuelas de gran prestigio.
Pero, evidentemente, tal atención preferencial es algo que no están dispuestos a hacer. Jamás se verá que un gran profesor dedique más atención, más recursos, a un alumno de posgrado proveniente de China con problemas de comunicación, por encima de un alumno blanco, nativo, proveniente de Harvard. Jamás se ha visto y jamás se verá. Lo que de hecho sucede en este país es que las mismísimas personas que tan vehementemente dicen defender la discriminación positiva, de hecho dedican más tiempo, muestran más interés y dan más apoyo a los estudiantes ya beneficiados por el racismo inherente a esta cultura. Así, sin mucha sorpresa, los departamentos se llenan de profesores blancos, varones, de clase media acomodada y educación privilegiada. Esto pretenden justificarlo apelando a la diferencia en capacidades entre los blancos y los hispanos, asiáticos, afroamericanos y mujeres. Los blancos, por alguna extraña razón que ellos parecen no comprender, son mejores. ¿Acaso es tan corta su imaginación que no logran ver que todo esto tiene origen en sus propias prácticas de trato preferencial a blancos, cómodos y bien educados? Todo esto demuestra, según veo, que en realidad no están dispuestos a defender la discriminación positiva. Todo se defiende siempre y cuando sean otros los que lo hagan.
La tan manoseada discriminación positiva se ha vuelto hoy día un instrumento más para tranquilizar los espíritus cristianos y temerosos de dios, que de tan pusilánimes no son capaces de reconocer su propia comodidad dentro de una práctica racista. Es, como decimos en mi pueblo, una manera de lavarse las manos. Eso sí, con mucho color. Nadie parece estar dispuesto a hacerlo!
Affirmative action mis huevos!
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Paradox of Paradox or Mental Realism
Here’s the problem:
If a puzzling chain of reasoning is to take our attention it must point to a problem about the world. Paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are among those puzzling arguments about the world that most attract our attention. However, if any paradox, dilemma, or antinomy were to be true of the world, it would stop. We know, however, that the world doesn’t stop. Thus, paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies must not be true about the world. If they are true at all they are true about something else. But then, paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are not interesting chains of reasoning that bring our attention to potential problems in the world. They could be discharged (as many students usually do) on the basis of irrelevance, ridicule, and even stupidity. Yet, most of the development in science (if not all through its history) is the result of tackling a puzzling chain of reasoning such as a paradox, a dilemma, or an antinomy. It follows then that puzzling chains of reasoning (such as paradoxes, dilemmas and antinomies) cannot be true about the world (for it would stop), but we still can help it and go on and solve them, or die trying.
Here’s a proposal:
Puzzling chains of reasoning such as paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are second level arguments that are true about our own mental states. These puzzling arguments result from the revision of our beliefs about the world, they give us a map of our own representation of the world, they tell us where the map has gone astray, or where it has come to a halt without hints of where to go or how to move. As a matter of fact, this is attractive enough for us to realize that something is wrong with the map.
And, here’s the important claim:
All this map problems could be equally dismissed if they were not to play a central role. Our representation of the world is not something independent, external, or separate from the world. Knowledge, belief and all the other mental states are, also, the world. They are part of what goes on in the environment. So, in a very strong and direct sense puzzling chains of reasoning are in fact true about the world. And the world does stop. Not, perhaps, the trees, rivers and oceans. But the world that faces the paradox, dilemma, or antinomy; the mind just can’t keep going on.
By solving paradoxes we are, in fact, helping the world go round and round.
If a puzzling chain of reasoning is to take our attention it must point to a problem about the world. Paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are among those puzzling arguments about the world that most attract our attention. However, if any paradox, dilemma, or antinomy were to be true of the world, it would stop. We know, however, that the world doesn’t stop. Thus, paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies must not be true about the world. If they are true at all they are true about something else. But then, paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are not interesting chains of reasoning that bring our attention to potential problems in the world. They could be discharged (as many students usually do) on the basis of irrelevance, ridicule, and even stupidity. Yet, most of the development in science (if not all through its history) is the result of tackling a puzzling chain of reasoning such as a paradox, a dilemma, or an antinomy. It follows then that puzzling chains of reasoning (such as paradoxes, dilemmas and antinomies) cannot be true about the world (for it would stop), but we still can help it and go on and solve them, or die trying.
Here’s a proposal:
Puzzling chains of reasoning such as paradoxes, dilemmas, and antinomies are second level arguments that are true about our own mental states. These puzzling arguments result from the revision of our beliefs about the world, they give us a map of our own representation of the world, they tell us where the map has gone astray, or where it has come to a halt without hints of where to go or how to move. As a matter of fact, this is attractive enough for us to realize that something is wrong with the map.
And, here’s the important claim:
All this map problems could be equally dismissed if they were not to play a central role. Our representation of the world is not something independent, external, or separate from the world. Knowledge, belief and all the other mental states are, also, the world. They are part of what goes on in the environment. So, in a very strong and direct sense puzzling chains of reasoning are in fact true about the world. And the world does stop. Not, perhaps, the trees, rivers and oceans. But the world that faces the paradox, dilemma, or antinomy; the mind just can’t keep going on.
By solving paradoxes we are, in fact, helping the world go round and round.
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